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R. Brent Cooper* and Michael W. Huddleston **
I. EXCESS LIABILITY
HE law of insurance in Texas, like so many other areas of Texas law,
is in a state of great change and turmoil. No area more exemplifies
this turmoil than that of excess liability or "bad faith." The Texas
Supreme Court, over the past year, has expanded old theories of recovery,
adopted new theories of recovery and extended the reach of statutory provi-
sions for treble damages into the realm of insurance law.
A. Stowers Liability
Negligence in Handling Case. In Ranger County Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Guin I Ranger issued an automobile policy naming Peden, the owner of a
dump truck, as the insured. Guin operated the truck for various entities,
including Peden's employer, Texas Bitulithic. Guin was involved in a colli-
sion with a truck owned by Eagle Trucking and operated by Fitch. Peden
and Guin filed a suit against Fitch and Eagle for property damage to Peden's
truck and for the personal injuries sustained by Guin. Fitch and Eagle
cross-claimed for personal injuries to Fitch and for property damage to the
truck operated by Fitch. The limits of liability under the policy issued by
Ranger to Peden were $10,000 per person and $20,000 per occurrence for
bodily injury and $10,000 per occurrence for property damage. The jury
found that Guin's negligence was one hundred percent of the cause of the
collision and awarded Fitch $216,232.25 for personal injury and awarded
Eagle $47,000 for property damage.2
Peden and Guin subsequently brought suit against Ranger under the
Stowers doctrine,3 asserting that the cross-claim could have been settled
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1. 723 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1987).
2. Id. at 658.
3. The Stowers doctrine derives from G. A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem.
Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved). This doctrine has typically
been used to impose liability above the policy limits when (1) the insurer defending the case,
(2) having received an unconditional offer to settle within the policy limits, (3) negligently
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within their policy limits, because an offer within the limits was made by the
claimants. Ranger attempted to defend the case on the basis that the offer to
settle was not an unconditional offer. The jury found, however, that Ranger
was negligent in the manner in which it handled the claim and lawsuit as-
serted against its insureds.4
The Texas Supreme Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the
offer made was unconditional because the court found that the Stowers doc-
trine is broader than the failure of an insurer to settle within policy limits. 5
The court emphasized that the duty of the insurer extends to the full range
of the insurer's responsibilities in the handling of the case against the in-
sured. 6 The court stated that an insurer is liable to its insured for damages
sustained as a proximate result of the insurer's negligence in investigation,
preparation for the defense of the lawsuit, trial of the case, or reasonable
attempts to settle. 7 In extending the holding of Stowers, the supreme court
ruled that, when the representation of the insured is concerned, the attorney
hired by the insurance carrier is the sub-agent of the insured and any negli-
gence attributable to the attorney will be imputed to the insurance carrier.8
The court in Guin held that the failure of the insurer and its agents to
inform the insured that an offer had been made was some evidence in sup-
port of the jury finding that Ranger handled the claim negligently. 9 The
court also found that the tender of the full limits conditioned on something
being paid to the insured on their own primary claim was also evidence sup-
refuses to settle, (4) resulting in a judgment in excess of the policy limits being rendered against
the insured. Comment, Bad Faith: Limiting Insurers' Extracontractual Liability in Texas, 41
Sw. L.J. 719, 722-23 (1987).
4. Guin, 723 S.W.2d at 658.
5. Id. at 659.
6. Id. The court reasoned that this duty comes from the fact that the policy gives the
insurer "complete and exclusive control of the investigation, negotiation and defense of the
claim." Id. One Texas court has specifically refused to extend Stowers to a situation where no
policy was ever in existence. William M. Mercer, Inc. v. Woods, 717 S.W.2d 391, 400 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1986, writ granted) (involving attempt to impose an excess judgment on an
insurance agent and insurer for failure to procure and issue coverage).
7. Guin, 723 S.W.2d at 659. The court did not elaborate on the measure of damages in
cases outside of the traditional Stowers context of settlement. Strong arguments can be made
that in negligent handling or investigation cases the measure of damages should not automati-
cally be the full extent of the excess judgment. It has been held that the excess judgment, while
some evidence of actual damages, is not conclusive evidence of the amount of damages. Wil-
liam M. Mercer, Inc. v. Woods, 717 S.W.2d at 399 (citing Montfort v. Jeter, 567 S.W.2d 498,
499-500 (Tex. 1978)).
8. Guin, 723 S.W.2d at 659. This result conflicts with Employer's Casualty Co. v. Tilley,
496 S.W.2d 552, 558 (Tex. 1973), in which the court held an attorney retained by a liability
carrier to defend an insured owes its duty of loyalty not to the carrier, but to the insured. The
court held that the insured is deemed to be the client of the defense counsel as if the counsel
had been retained by the insured in the first instance. Id. The court in Guin is apparently
attempting to drive a wedge between the defense counsel and the insured. For purposes of
fiduciary responsibility and loyalty, the court apparently holds that the defense counsel is the
agent of the insured; while for purposes of imputing liability for any negligent act of the de-
fense counsel, the court holds that the defense counsel is the agent of the insurer. 723 S.W.2d
at 663 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 660; see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 680 S.W.2d 595, 608 (Tex. App.-Tyler
1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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porting the jury finding of negligence. 10 The court apparently found addi-
tional evidence of negligence in the fact Ranger authorized its attorney only
to offer the personal injury limits, and not the separate property damage
limits. ''
Statute of Limitations. In Nash v. Carolina Casualty Insurance Co. 12 Nash
was involved in a collision on December 29, 1976, with a truck owned by
Lock. Nash filed suit against Lock and the driver of the truck. The insurer
incorrectly refused to defend Lock or his driver on the grounds that the
particular vehicle was not included within the coverage. The court rendered
judgment in excess of the policy limits against Lock and his driver. Nash
later obtained an assignment of any rights of the insured to recover the por-
tion of the underlying judgment in excess of the policy limits. On December
23, 1983, Nash, as assignee, filed suit, alleging that the insurer acted negli-
gently and breached the contract of insurance. Nash asserted that the in-
surer breached the contract willfully and in bad faith and violated the
DTPA 13 and the Texas Insurance Code 14 by failing to defend and by failing
to negotiate a settlement of the underlying suit.
The Dallas court of appeals ruled that the Stowers action brought by Nash
was a tort action and barred unless filed within two years after the action
accrued.Is The court ruled that the Stowers action accrued on the date that
the judgment against the insured became final, which was more than two
years prior to the bringing of suit. 16 Nash asserted that the refusal to defend
was contractual in nature and was therefore governed by the four-year stat-
ute of limitations.17 The court agreed with this argument, but held that a
claim for failure to defend matures when the defense is refused.18 Because
the insurer refused defense of the driver more than four years before suit, the
court held these claims were also barred. 19
Nash also asserted that the DTPA and Insurance Code claims were gov-
erned by the four-year DTPA and Insurance Code statute of limitations in
force when the refusal to defend occurred. The court held that even apply-
ing this statute of limitations, the claims were barred because they accrued
when the insurer refused to defend, more than four years prior to the filing
10. Guin, 723 S.W.2d at 660. The court's holding is difficult to understand. The court's
ruling makes the insurer responsible for the actions of defense counsel even if the actions were
taken in pursuit of his separate agency/contractual relationship with the insureds as their
plaintiff's attorney pursuing their own rights of recovery.
11. Id. at 659.
12. 741 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ denied).
13. Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon 1987).
14. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
15. Nash, 741 S.W.2d at 600.
16. Id.
17. Id. In William M. Mercer, Inc. v. Woods, 717 S.W.2d 391, 397-98 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 1986, writ granted), the court held that the two-year statute of limitations applied
to refusal to defend and/or failure to procure insurance against an insurance agent.
18. Nash, 741 S.W.2d at 600-01; accord Mercer, 717 S.W.2d at 397-98.




B. Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
First-Party Insurance. In Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Insurance
Co. 21 Glen Arnold was severely injured when a car driven by an uninsured
motorist struck the motorcycle he was operating. Arnold had uninsured
motorist coverage with National County with a limit of $10,000. A timely
demand was made for payment, and National County refused to pay the
claim. Arnold brought suit against the uninsured motorist and National
County in late June 1974; in December 1977, Arnold obtained a judgment
against both defendants for $17,975. National County subsequently paid
Arnold the $10,000 policy limits. Arnold then filed suit on December 27,
1978, asserting that National County breached its duty of good faith and fair
dealing and violated numerous statutory duties. The trial court granted
summary judgment against Arnold, and the court of appeals affirmed. 22
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed National County's summary judg-
ment, rejecting Arnold's claims under the DTPA23 and article 21.21-2 of the
Texas Insurance Code24 because county mutual insurance companies were
exempted from the application of these acts when suit was brought. The
court, however, reversed the rulings of the court of appeals and trial court in
holding that a duty of good faith and fair dealing existed between Arnold
and National County.25
The Arnold court found that the duty arises from the special relationship
in the insurance context from the unequal bargaining power of the parties
and the ability of unscrupulous insurers to take advantage of insureds.
2 6
The court emphasized that insurers have exclusive control of the evaluation,
processing, and denial of claims and thus have a duty of ordinary care.27
The court ruled that a cause of action for breach of the duty of good faith is
stated when the insured alleges that no reasonable explanation or basis exists
for denial of the claim or for delay on the part of the insurer in payment of
the claim. 28 Such an action exists where it is alleged that the insurer failed
20. Id.
21. 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987).
22. Id. at 166.
23. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon 1987).
24. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
25. 725 S.W.2d at 167. The duty of good faith and fair dealing had been rejected on
several occasions by Texas courts. The duty was most recently raised in a contractual context
in English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983), in which the court rejected the duty as
being "contrary to our well-reasoned and long-established adversary system which has served
us ably in Texas for almost 150 years." The court noted that the present system allows the
parties to a dispute to bring their case to an impartial tribunal for an adjudication of their
rights under the contract. Id. The danger noted by the court in adopting such a duty is that it
"would abolish our system of government according to settled rules of law and let each case be
decided upon what might seem fair and in good faith" to the fact finder. Id. at 522. A serious
question exists as to why the supreme court reversed itself only three years after Fischer.
26. Arnold, 725 S.W.2d at 167.
27. Id.
28. Id.; accord Lee v. Safemate Life Ins. Co., 737 S.W.2d 84, 85 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1987, writ dism'd) (applying similar duty of good faith to a disability carrier). It would appear
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to exercise ordinary care in its investigation to determine whether a reason-
able basis existed for denial or delay in payment.
29
The action for breach of the duty of good faith, because the court placed it
in the law of torts, broadens the potential damages recoverable. Clearly,
mental anguish damages may be recovered.30 Importantly, exemplary dam-
ages may be recovered.3 ' Recovery of damages in a bad faith action, how-
ever, will still be governed by the rules permitting recovery of damages in
other tort actions.3
2
The court in Arnold last addressed whether the statute of limitations
barred the breach of the duty of good faith claim. 33 The court agreed that
the applicable statute of limitations was the two-year statute.3 4 The court
held, however, that the statute did not begin to run on a bad faith claim until
the underlying insurance contract claims were finally resolved. 35 The court
thus rejected the argument that the insured's cause of action accrued when
that the Texas duty of good faith is a negligence concept that may be best described as an
illegitimate child conceived by the law of tort and contracts, which some have referred to as
the law of "contorts." In any event, as suggested in Fischer, 660 S.W.2d at 522, one must ask
why the court finds it necessary to create another cause of action to regulate conduct that is
already regulated by negligence, contract law, and a whole host of statutory causes of action
under the DTPA and the Texas Insurance Code? Similar questions were raised in Melody
Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 352-55 (Tex. 1987) (adopting a new implied war-
ranty cause of action in service contracts despite existence of available causes of action of
negligence and breach of contract).
29. Arnold, 725 S.W.2d at 167. Justice Gonzales, in a concurring opinion, added the
requirement that the person seeking relief establish a contractual relationship between himself
and the insurer. Id. at 168. One significant issue remaining at this point is whether the duty
will extend to third-party claimants under a liability policy who have no contractual relation-
ship with the insurer. The majority rule in other jurisdictions is that the duty of good faith and
fair dealing arises out of the personal relationship existing between the insured and insurer and
no such duty exists to a claimant under a liability policy who is not an insured. See infra note
41 and accompanying text. Existing Texas law on this subject would support the majority
position. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
30. Arnold, 725 S.W.2d at 168.
31. Id. This holding would appear to be in conflict with the recent decision of the court in
Jim Walters Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. 1986), in which the court held
that an action for negligence, based on a duty arising from a contract, seeking economic loss as
damages is really a contract action that cannot support an award of exemplary damages.
Under Reed, insureds would appear to be required to establish tort damages, such as mental
anguish, to support an exemplary damage award because ordinarily economic damages for
breach of contract will not support an exemplary damage award. 711 S.W.2d at 618.
32. Arnold, 725 S.W.2d at 168.
33. Id. at 167.
34. Id. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (Vernon 1958) (now TEX. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE § 16.003 (Vernon 1986)).
35. Arnold, 725 S.W.2d at 168. In the original majority opinion, written by Justice Ray,
this holding was unaccompanied by a footnote. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 177, 179. In the opinion
published by West Publishing Company, however, a footnote was added, which stated: "This
does not mean that a contract claim and a claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing may not be tried together when possible." 725 S.W.2d at 168 n.1. This footnote was
not added by any revisions to the opinion published in the Journal, and, because of its sudden
and mysterious appearance in the West version of the opinion, it has become known as the
"phantom footnote." On February 6, 1988, more than a year after the original publication of
the opinion, the court finally published an errata noting the addition of the "phantom foot-
note." 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 193 (Feb. 6, 1988).
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the insurer rejected his claim. 36
The duty of good faith and fair dealing was again raised in Chitsey v. Na-
tional Lloyds Insurance Co. 37 In that case, Chitsey obtained a fire policy
with National Lloyds at a face value of $16,000. On January 9, 1981, a fire
occurred at the insured premises. Chitsey contended that the structure was
a total loss, entitling him to the face value of the policy. Chitsey had ob-
tained two estimates indicating that the cost of repairs would be $16,000.
National Lloyds rejected the estimates obtained by the insured and obtained
an estimate of its own of slightly over $7,000 and offered to settle for that
amount. Chitsey refused the offer and filed suit, asserting, among other
things, that National Lloyds had breached its duty of good faith and fair
dealing in the handling of the claim.
The Texas Supreme Court ruled that a duty of good faith and fair dealing
existed between Chitsey and National Lloyds that would give rise to tort
damages.38 Of particular importance in this case is footnote 1 to the opinion
in which the court rejected the court of appeals' characterization of the case
as involving a "covenant" of good faith and fair dealing.39 The court noted
that covenants are primarily contractual in nature and that the breach in this
case was not of a contract but of a duty imposed by law.40 The issue
presented by this statement is whether the duty will ultimately be extended
to persons lacking a contractual relationship with the insurer. The only
cases addressing this point to date have held that the duty only extends to
the insureds under the contract. 41
36. Arnold, 725 S.W.2d at 168 (citing Linkenhoger v. American Fidelity & Casualty Co.,
152 Tex. 534, 539, 260 S.W.2d 884, 887 (1953) (involving accrual in a Stowers case)).
37. 738 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. 1987).
38. Id. at 643.
39. Id. at 558.
40. Id.
41. See Chaffin v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 731 S.W.2d 728, 732 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The majority rule in other jurisdictions is that the duty of
good faith runs only to the insured, not to a third-party claimant. See Dickey v. Farm Bureau
Mut. Ins. Co., 447 So. 2d 693, 694 (Ala. 1984) (attempting to recover from automobile insurer
for repairs to auto damaged in collision with insured vehicle); Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17
Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 586, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976) (seeking balance of wrongful death
judgment from insurer of tortfeasor); Eichler v. Scott Pools, Inc., 513 N.E.2d 665, 667 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1987) (seeking damages from automobile accident in which plaintiff's parents were
the insureds); Linscott v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 368 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Me. 1977)
(charging deceit and misrepresentation by tortfeasor's insurer); Magalski v. Maryland Casu-
alty Co., 21 Md. App. 136, 318 A.2d 843, 849 (1974) (claiming damages for tortfeasor's in-
surer's refusal to pay property damage); Chavez v. Chenoweth, 89 N.M. 423, 553 P.2d 703,
709 (Ct. App. 1976) (claiming against defendant's insurer for unreasonable delay); D. H.
Overmyer Telecasting Co. v. American Home Assur. Co., 29 Ohio App. 3d 31, 502 N.E.2d
694, 698 (1986) (claiming against attorney's liability insurer); Tank v. State Farm Fire & Casu-
alty Co., 715 P.2d 1133, 1139 (Wash. 1986) (claiming against insurer of defendant in assault
action).
Texas law would also dictate this result because the duty of good faith arises out of the
special relationship that exists between the insurer and the insured. Arnold, 725 S.W.2d at
167.. This special relationship does not exist between the insurer and the third-party claimant.
Duncan v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 91 N.H. 349, 23 A.2d 325, 326 (1941); see also
Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1136, 1175-
77 (1954) (discussing insurer's lack of duty to claimant). In a concurring opinion in English v.
Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. 1983), Justice Spears noted that such a duty did not exist
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Third Party Insurance. In Chaffin v. Transamerica Insurance Co. 42 Chaffin
sued U.S. Seal for negligence in the waterproofing of roofs of townhomes
owned by Chaffin. U.S. Seal admitted liability and notified Transamerica, its
liability insurance carrier, of the claim. Transamerica denied the claim on
the basis of no coverage. Chaffin sued Transamerica for tortious handling of
the property claim. Transamerica later admitted that it was incorrect in
denying coverage and paid its limits to Chaffin. Chaffin, however, continued
the suit against Transamerica.
One of the bases upon which Chaffin predicated liability against Trans-
america was the breach of the duty of good faith. The court of appeals held
that the duty of good faith and fair dealing runs only from an insurer to its
insured. 43 The court stated that a liability carrier owes no such duty when
dealing with a third party claimant. 44
Workers' Compensation. The duty of good faith and fair dealing was ex-
tended to the processing of claims by workers' compensation carriers in
Aranda v. Insurance Co. of North America.45 The court reasoned that the
employee is a party to the insurance contact and that the contract creates the
same type of relationship as other insurance contracts. 46 The court rejected
arguments that the role of the Industrial Accident Board alters this relation-
ship.47 The court stated that the elements of a bad faith action require proof
that a reasonable insurer would not have delayed or denied the benefits and
that the carrier actually knew there was no reasonable basis for the denial or
delay or that the carrier should have known there was no reasonable basis
for denial or delay.48 The court rejected arguments that the Workers Com-
pensation Act exclusivity provision49 barred bad faith claims.50
in all contractual relationships but only those which involved a special relationship. One ex-
ample cited by Justice Spears was the duty to make a good faith effort to settle a liability case.
Id. (citing Stowers, 15 S.W.2d at 547). Indeed, under Texas law, the cause of action for excess
damages for breach of this duty is personal to the insured and may not be brought by the
underlying tort claimant. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 464 S.W.2d 91, 95 (Tex.
1971) (holding insured entitled to sue liability insurer for failure to settle); Becker v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 678 S.W.2d 561, 562 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (hold-
ing plaintiff had no standing to sue insurer for excess judgment against insured); Samford v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 529 S.W.2d 84, 87 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(holding judgment creditor had no action against debtor's insurer for negligence in settling
claim); Cook v. Superior Ins. Co., 476 S.W.2d 363, 364 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that judgment creditor could not sue judgment debtor's liability insurer).
42. 731 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
43. Id. at 732.
44. Id.
45. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 279 (March 23, 1988), rev'g, 722 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1986, writ granted).
46. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 281.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1988). The court also re-
fused to find that the penalty provision in TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 18a
(Vernon Supp. 1988) barred bad faith claims. Aranda, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 283.
50. Aranda, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 282.
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C. Deceptive Trade Practices and Article 21.21 of the Insurance Code
First Party Insurance. As noted above, in Chitsey v. National Lloyds Insur-
ance Co. 51 Chitsey brought suit against its insurer under article 21.21 of the
Insurance Code52 for failing to use due diligence in determining the amount
of Chitsey's loss under a fire policy. The court of appeals rejected Chitsey's
cause of action under article 21.21 for unfair practices and held that the acts
which Chitsey complained of could not be the basis of a cause of action
under the Insurance Code.53
The Texas Supreme Court in Chitsey affirmed the judgment of the court of
appeals, holding that Chitsey failed to establish facts that would constitute a
violation of the Insurance Code.54 The court noted that section 16 of article
21.21 prohibits three types of conduct: (1) conduct prohibited under section
4 of article 21.21 as unfair competition or a deceptive trade practice; (2) con-
duct not permitted by the rules or regulations lawfully adopted by the State
Insurance Board under article 21.21; and (3) practices prohibited by the
DTPA in section 17.46 as unlawful deceptive trade practices.5 5 Chitsey did
not claim that National Lloyds engaged in the first or third types of prohib-
ited conduct. Rather, Chitsey argued that National Lloyds engaged in the
second type of conduct prohibited by section 16.
Chitsey asserted that National Lloyds was guilty of a violation of State
Board of Insurance Orders 41060 and 41454.56 Board Order 41454 defined
an unfair claim settlement practice as the refusal to pay claims without con-
ducting a reasonable investigation with such frequency as to indicate a gen-
eral business practice. 57 The court ruled that this order required more than
proof of a single act.58 Because Chitsey neither proved nor obtained findings
that Lloyds' refusal to reasonably investigate was committed with such fre-
quency as to indicate a general business practice, the court held that there
could be no recovery under Board Order 41454. 59
In Lee v. Safemate Life Insurance Co. 60 the plaintiff brought suit for viola-
tions of article 21.21 and article 21.21-2 of the Texas Insurance Code. Lee
purchased disability insurance from Safemate to secure payment of an auto-
mobile loan from a credit union. Lee claimed that she became ill from
thrombophlebitis and she was terminated from her employment without
pay. She applied to Safemate for the loan payments that she was unable to
make, but Safemate denied these claims, asserting her disease was a preexist-
ing condition. The plaintiff brought suit under article 21.21, section 16 of
51. 738 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. 1987).
52. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
53. 738 S.W.2d at 643.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 642; TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
56. Texas State Bd. of Ins., Amendment of Unfair Competition and Unfair Practices of
Insurers' Rules, Docket No. 41060 (June 4, 1982), Docket No. 41454 (Aug. 10, 1982).
57. Texas State Bd. of Ins., Docket No. 41454 (Aug. 10, 1982).
58. 738 S.W.2d at 643.
59. Id.
60. 737 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, no writ).
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the Texas Insurance Code. 61 The jury found that the insurance company
engaged in unfair acts or practices in the handling of plaintiff's claim by
(1) engaging in unreasonable and unjustified delays, (2) failing to use due
diligence, and (3) failing to deal in good faith.62 The trial court ruled that
these findings would not support an award under article 21.21.63
The court of appeals in Lee addressed each of the three types of conduct
actionable under article 21.21, section 16(a). 64 With respect to section 4 of
article 21.21, the court noted that the section contains eight subsections de-
fining unfair practices in the businesses of insurance, and none of them per-
tained to unfair claim settlement practices. 65 The court specifically held that
the prohibitions regarding false advertising had no application to the denial
of the claim by an insurance company.66
With respect to the violation of the State Board of Insurance's rules and
regulations, Lee contended that Safemate had violated Board Orders 41060
and 27085.67 The court noted that Board Order 27085 deals with unfair acts
and practices in the settlement of claims. 68 The court, however, held that
violation of the board order was not a violation of section 16 since Board
Order 27085 was adopted under the provisions of article 21.21-2 rather than
article 21.21.69 The court also ruled that Board Order 41060 contained no
prohibition relating to acts or practices in the settlement of claims. 70 The
court concluded that, contrary to the supreme court's holding in Chitsey,
nothing in Board Order 41060 required incorporation of the provisions of
another board order requiring reasonable investigation of claims. 7'
With respect to the claimed violation of section 17.46 of the DTPA, the
court in Lee noted that none of the proscribed practices dealt with claims
settlement practices. 72 The court found nothing in section 17.46 that could
form the basis for a judgment. 73 Finally, the plaintiff argued that the de-
fendant's violation of Board Order 27085 would be actionable under article
21.21-2 inasmuch as the order was adopted pursuant to that provision. The
court of appeals, however, following earlier authority, noted that article
21.21-2 provides no cause of action to individual insureds.74
The Texas Supreme Court has granted writ in the 1985 case of Texas
61. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
62. 737 S.W.2d at 85.
63. Id. at 84.
64. Id. at 85.
65. Id. at 86.
66. Id.
67. Texas State Bd. of Ins., Amendment of Unfair Competition and Unfair Practices of
Insurers' Rules, Docket No. 41060 (June 4, 1982); Docket No. 27085 (May 17, 1974) (now
Texas State Bd. of Ins., Docket No. 41454 (Aug. 10, 1982)).




72. Id. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (Vernon 1987).
73. 737 S.W.2d at 86.
74. Id.; see Cantu v. Western Fire & Casualty Co., Ltd., 716 S.W.2d 737, 741 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1986), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 723 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1987).
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Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Vail,75 which addresses the availabil-
ity of statutory relief and excess damages in first-party cases. The court of
appeals in Vail refused to extend the Stowers doctrine, apparently as a basis
for a duty of good faith, to first-party carriers. 76 The Vail court noted that a
liability carrier's duties and responsibilities differ from a property insurer's
obligations. 77 The court added that because the legislature did not create a
cause of action for unfair claims practice under the DTPA, the legislature
intended to prevent actions for unfair claims settlements under the compre-
hensive wording of the DTPA and Insurance Code. 78 The court also held
that a violation of section 4(a) of Board Order 18663 was not actionable
because it was enacted pursuant to article 21.21-2, which does not create a
private cause of action. 79
Workers' Compensation. In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Marshall80
Aetna entered into an agreed judgment with Marshall settling his workers'
compensation claims. As part of the settlement, Aetna agreed to pay future
medical costs incurred within five years from the date of the judgment. The
settlement agreement was incorporated into a judgment signed August 3,
1978. After entry of the judgment, Marshall encountered difficulties with
Aetna in obtaining reimbursement for medical expenses he had incurred,
experiencing payments delays from four to seventeen months. Aetna as-
serted that its refusal to pay these expenses was based upon its mistaken
reliance upon the terms of a copy of a proposed judgment in its file that
would have given Aetna the right to approve Marshall's medical treatment.
Aetna admitted the judgment actually entered by the trial court did not give
it any such right. Marshall filed suit under article 21.21 of the Insurance
Code for treble damages and also alleged breaches of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing. The trial court entered a judgment awarding treble dam-
ages to Marshall, and the court of appeals affirmed.8'
Although the Supreme Court granted writ to consider the validity of the
cause of action for breach of the duty of good faith, the court declined to
resolve the issue, because Marshall elected to proceed on the basis of his
recovery under article 21.21 of the Insurance Code. 82 Aetna attempted to
defend the article 21.21 claim by arguing that Marshall as a claimant under
a workers' compensation policy was not a consumer of goods or services. 83
75. 695 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ granted).
76. Id. at 694.
77. Id.
78. Id. (quoting Comment, An Insurer's Failure to Settle: Standing Under the Stowers
Doctrine, Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and Article 21.21 of the Insurance Code, 34
BAYLOR L. REV. 441, 455 (1982)).
79. Vail, 695 S.W.2d at 694; accord McKnight v. Ideal Mut. Ins. Co., 534 F. Supp. 362,
364 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
80. 724 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1987).
81. Id. at 771.
82. Id. at 772.
83. Id. The Fort Worth court of civil appeals in Rodriquez v. Texas Employers' Ins.
Ass'n, 598 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.), had previ-
ously held that no cause of action existed under the DTPA for unfair claims settlement prac-
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The supreme court rejected this argument on the grounds that article 21.21
does not require proof that Marshall was a consumer of goods or services.8 4
The court, instead, noted that article 21.21 allows a cause of action to a
person who was injured by the acts of another insurance carrier. 85
Aetna contended that a compromise settlement agreement that is incorpo-
rated into a judgment is not an insurance policy and that the mere failure to
pay a judgment is not actionable under article 21.21. The Texas Supreme
Court disagreed and ruled that any person engaging in conduct prohibited
by section 4 is liable to another pursuant to the provisions of section 16 of
article 21.21.86 Aetna next argued that Marshall's claim under the Workers'
Compensation Act was limited to unpaid medical expenses plus twelve per-
cent penalty. The supreme court held that the statutory penalties were not
the exclusive remedy available to the injured claimant and that relief could
be sought under article 21.21.87 Aetna's last argument to the supreme court
was that Marshall was required to submit his dispute to the Industrial Acci-
dent Board (IAB) prior to the bringing of the case in the district court.88
The court rejected this argument because the statute did not become effec-
tive until August 29, 1983, more than four years after Marshall initiated his
suit against Aetna. 89
The holding in Aetna was followed by the El Paso court of appeals in
Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. McDonough.90 In that case, McDon-
ough and Liberty Mutual entered into a compromise settlement agreement
requiring Liberty Mutual to pay all future hospital medical expenses result-
ing from the claimant's injuries, if the medical procedures were performed
under the direction or referral of Dr. Mims or Dr. Driscoll during a five-year
period. The claimant had two back operations prior to the execution of this
settlement agreement and two operations after the agreement. Dr. Driscoll
recommended a fifth surgery and the claims supervisor refused authorization
until the claimant obtained a second opinion. The surgery was performed in
October of 1984. The carrier did not pay the doctor and hospital bills until
the setting of a hearing before the IAB in March of 1985. In February of
1985, McDonough filed suit seeking damages resulting from the delay in
payment of the medical bills. The bases for his suit included violations of
section 17.46 of the DTPA and section 16 of article 21.21 of the Insurance
Code. 91 The jury found that the delay in payment of the medical benefits
tices of a workers' compensation carrier because the worker did not occupy the status of a
consumer as required by the DTPA.




88. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 12b (Vernon Supp. 1988); see also King
v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 716 S.W.2d 181, 183-84 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no
writ) (holding that workmen's compensation claimant must give notice to Industrial Accident
Board of refusal by defendant to pay claim before bringing action in district court).
89. 724 S.W.2d at 772.
90. 734 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, no writ).
91. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (Vernon 1987); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art.
21.21, § 16 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
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constituted a misrepresentation of the benefits to be provided pursuant to the
compromise settlement agreement. 92 Liberty Mutual contended that the
claimant had no cause of action under article 21.21. The El Paso court of
appeals rejected this argument, noting that under Marshall93 misrepresenta-
tions as to the benefits contained in the compromise settlement agreement
were precisely the sort of conduct intended to give rise to a cause of action
under section 17.46.94
II. GENERAL LIABILITY
Broad Form Workmanship Exclusion. The Dallas court of appeals held in
Dorchester Development v. Safeco Insurance Co. 95 that the insurer had no
duty to defend a suit against the insured, a general contractor, for damage to
an apartment complex the insured failed to repair.96 The policy provided
broad form property damage coverage, which included exclusion y(2)(d)(iii)
for property damage due to faulty workmanship by the insured.97 The court
found that the plaintiff failed to allege damage to other, nondefective, work
performed by the insured and indicated that this type of damage would be
covered. 98 The court concluded that exclusion y(2)(d)(iii) obviated coverage
under the policy because the policy was not intended to provide the contrac-
tor protection for his own failure to perform. 99
The decision in Dorchester does not clearly indicate whether it involved
damages within the "completed operations" hazard, 1°° dealing with prop-
erty damage occurring after the work has been completed and/or the prop-
erty has been put to its intended use by the purchaser. The broad form
property damage endorsement includes a specific exclusion y(3) for com-
pleted operations claims. This exclusion applies only to work performed by
92. 734 S.W.2d at 67.
93. 724 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1987).
94. McDonough, 734 S.W.2d at 68.
95. 737 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
96. 737 S.W.2d at 381-82. The damages alleged included (1) crumbling concrete flooring,
(2) paint peeling from gutters, and (3) a failure to include perimeter beams in certain patio
slabs.
97. Exclusion y(2)(d)(iii) states that:
The insurance does not apply to ... property damage to that particular part of
any property not on premises owned by or rented to the insured .... the restora-
tion, repair or replacement of which has been made or is necessary by reason of
faulty workmanship thereon by or on behalf of the insured.
98. Id. As indicated in Dorchester, the scope of y(2)(d)(iii) is still restricted to excluding
damage to "that particular part of the property that must be repaired because of defective
workmanship. Thus, where the part" of the work that caused the damaged can be identified,
only that particular part will be excluded. 737 S.W.2d at 382. For example, in C. 0. Falter,
Inc. v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 79 Misc. 2d 981, 361 N.Y.S.2d 968 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974), a
gas line built by a subcontractor leaked under the building under construction. The court held
that only the cost of repairing the work on the gas line was excluded. Id. See Bond Brothers,
Inc. v. Robinson, 393 Mass. 546, 471 N.E.2d 1332, 1333 (1984); Frankel v. J. Watson Co.,
Inc., 21 Mass. App. 43, 484 N.E.2d 104, 105 (1985); Lusalon, Inc. v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 23 Mass. App. 903, 498 N.E.2d 1373, 1374 (1986).
99. 737 S.W.2d at 382 (citing Eulich v. Home Indem. Co., 503 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
100. 737 S.W.2d at 381-83.
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the named insured, not to work performed by or on behalf of the insured by
subcontractors. This appears to be a major distinction in scope between y(3)
and y(2)(d)(iii). In other words, if the work performed by subcontractors
failed after the work was completed, it would not necessarily be excluded
under the plain language of y(3). A number of courts, however, have held
that the deletion of "by or on behalf of" in exclusion y(3) does not indicate
that coverage was intended for the failure of component work performed by
subcontractors.' 0 1 These courts theorize that when the general contractor
transfers the completed project to the owner, all work performed by the sub-
contractors merges into the contractor's product.102
Some commentators suggest that the exclusions under y(2)(d) were in-
tended to apply to only property damage occurring prior to completion.103
Nevertheless, several courts, including the court of appeals in Dorchester,
have implicitly held that y(2)(d)(iii) applies even in the context of completed
operations. 104
Date of Occurrence. The court in Dorchester also addressed the issue of
when property damage under a general liability policy has occurred for pur-
poses of determining whether the damages fall within the policy period. 10 5
This appears to be the first Texas case addressing this issue. 10 6 The court
followed the decision of the Florida Court of Appeals in Travelers Insurance
Co. v. C.J. Gayfer's & Co. ,107 in which it was held that the words "caused by
an occurrence" meant that coverage was only afforded if a detectable injury
or damage, not merely an act or omission, occurred during the policy pe-
riod.'0 8 The Dorchester court concluded that the insurer is liable only if the
property damage is identifiable during the policy period. 1 9 The court in
Dorchester noted that the insured had admitted, by failing to answer requests
for admission, that the damages were not manifest during the policy
101. See, e.g., Tucker Constr. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 423 So. 2d 525, 528 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (holding constructed floor of restaurant not covered after contractor
accepted subcontractor's work and transferred completed work to owner); Knutson Constr. v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 396 N.W.2d 229, 236 (Minn. 1986) (holding faulty workman-
ship is business risk of general contractor).
102. Knutson, 396 N.W.2d at 236-37.
103. GIBSON, BROAD FORM PROPERTY DAMAGE COVERAGE: ANALYSIS, APPLICATION
AND ALTERNATIVES 10 (2d ed. 1982); F. C. & S. Bulletin, PUBLIC LIABILITY Epb-7 (1982).
This interpretation is consistent with the manner in which y(2)(d) is arranged. At least four of
the six sections of y(2)(d) deal expressly with damage to property "while on the premises,"
"while being used ... in performing operations," "while in custody" of the insured to be
installed or constructed, and while operations are being performed.
104. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc. v. Pole Bldgs., Inc., 478 F.2d 185, 187 (9th Cir. 1973);
C. 0. Falter, Inc. v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 79 Misc. 2d 981, 361 N.Y.S.2d 968, 975 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1974).
105. 737 S.W.2d at 383.
106. Id.
107. 366 So. 2d 1199, 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
108. 737 S.W.2d at 383 (quoting C. J. Gayfers, 366 So. 2d at 1201). The Dorchester court
also noted that the Idaho Supreme Court had reached a similar result in Miller's Mut. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Ed Bailey, Inc., 103 Idaho 377, 647 P.2d 1249, 1251 (1982), wherein the court held
that the time of occurrence of an accident is not the time when the wrongful act was commit-
ted, but is the time that the complaining party was actually damaged. 737 S.W.2d at 383.




The rule adopted in Dorchester appears to be consistent with the majority
rule in other jurisdictions. 1 "I A different rule may apply if the case involves
property with latent defects that later cause injury or damage. 112 Some
courts in other jurisdictions have followed the exposure rule rather than the
manifestation or discovery rule when the problems are latent and involve
identifiable, continued injuries. 1 3 In several cases involving property dam-
ages which slowly developed and/or accumulated, courts have used the ex-
posure rule to invoke coverage for all carriers on the risk during the
development or exposure period. 114 The Dorchester court apparently con-
cluded that the damages alleged did not involve latent, continued and accu-
mulated property damage.' 1 5
Deductibles/Construction. In Clemtex, Inc. v. Southeastern Fidelity Insur-
ance Co. 116 the court addressed whether each liability insurer, with respect
to silicosis claims, is entitled to a full per claim deductible when held liable
to the insured for only that portion or percentage of the period of exposure
of the claimant that falls within the policy period. Under the exposure rule,
10. Id.
111. See, e.g., MRAZ v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1327 (4th Cir. 1986)
(holding that the date of discovery of damage applied in a case involving the depositing of toxic
waste over a lengthy period of time); Blue Streak Indus., Inc. v. N. L. Indus. Inc., 650 F. Supp.
733, 736 (E.D. La. 1986) (holding that the manifestation rule applied despite the fact that the
alleged damage to gears occurred in microtraumas from the moment the gears were installed
until the actual date of manifestation); Bartholomew v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 502 F. Supp.
246, 252-53 (D.R.I. 1980), aff'd, 671 F.2d 496 (lst Cir. 1981) (holding that damages resulting
from defects in manufactured car wash unit did not occur until it became apparent that prod-
uct was fundamentally flawed); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. American Ins. Co., 345
N.E.2d 267, 271 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that occurrence was not equivalent to time of
tortious act, but was established when spalling of defective bricks first became apparent);
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Johnson Shoes, Inc., 461 A.2d 85, 87 (N.H. 1983) (hold-
ing that there was no occurrence until time when damage, involving underground leaks from
oil tank, became known to insured).
112. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1225
(6th Cir. 1980).
113. See, e.g., Lac D'Amiante Du Quebec, Ltee. v. American Home Assurance Co., 613 F.
Supp. 1549, 1561 (D. N.J. 1985) (adopting the "continuous trigger" rule in cases involving
asbestos property damage); California Union Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 145 Cal. App. 3d
462, 476, 193 Cal. Rptr. 461, 469 (1983) (applying discovery rule to case involving progressive
leaks from pipe running to pool); CPS Chem. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 199 N.J. Super. 558,
489 A.2d 1265, 1269 (1984) (holding that coverage was invoked during entire period deposits
of toxic waste were made at city waste dump, a form of the exposure rule); Boggs v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 252 S.E.2d 565, 567 (S.C. 1979) (holding that drainage difficulties, result-
ing in gradual seepage of water into home, invoked coverage as result of language in policy to
the effect that injurious exposure to conditions may be produced over a lengthy period of
time); Gruol Constr. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 11 Wash. App. 623, 524 P.2d 427, 430
(1974) (involving dry rot resulting from negligent backfill at apartment complex).
114. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, n.18 (6th
Cir. 1980) (citing Maples v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 83 Cal. App. 3d 641, 644, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 80, 81-82 (1978); Tisseling v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 55 Cal.
App. 3d 623, 626, 127 Cal. Rptr. 681, 683 (1976); Remmer v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 140
Cal. App. 2d 84, 295 P.2d 19, 21 (1956); Deodata v. Hartford Ins. Co., 143 N.J. Super. 396,
363 A.2d 361, 365 (1976), aff'd, 154 N.J. Super. 263, 381 A.2d 364 (1977)).
115. Dorchester, 737 S.W.2d at 382.
116. 807 F.2d 1271, 1272-73 (5th Cir. 1987) (applying Texas law).
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the Fifth Circuit has held that when claims involving progressive diseases
resulting from exposure to products such as asbestos and silicon are brought
against the insured, each insurer during the period of exposure is liable for a
pro rata portion of the overall liability of the insured. 17 The insurers in
Clemtex paid only a portion of each claim, but they each required the in-
sured to pay a full deductible for each claim."18
The insured argued that the deductible should be apportioned according
to a prorata percentage based on each insurer's limit of liability. The
Clemtex court rejected this argument. 9 The court held, however, that the
policy was ambiguous on the amount of the deductible in progressive disease
cases.' 20 The court indicated that summary judgment evidence suggested
that Clemtex understood a full deductible was expected when it entered into
the insurance contracts.' 2' The court held that the district court could look
to extrinsic evidence of the intent of the parties and other permissible aids of
interpretation to resolve the ambiguity.' 22
Contractual Liability. The Dallas court of appeals, in Mary Kay Cosmetics,
Inc. v. North River Insurance Co.,123 held that the insurer had no duty to
defend a claim against an insured for the breach of contract resulting from
the insured's failure to indemnify and hold harmless the claimant for loss
and expenses arising out of the purchase and installation of a product from
the insured. First, the court noted that the policy defined contractual liabil-
ity as involving liability assumed under a written contract.1 24 Second, the
117. Id. The Fifth Circuit adopted the exposure rule in Ducre v. Executive Officers of
Halter Marine, Inc., 752 F.2d 976, 992, 994 (5th Cir. 1985) (Louisiana law) (silicosis) and
Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1142 (5th Cir.) (Louisiana law) (asbestosis),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981). As yet, no Texas court has addressed the issue of when
there has been an occurrence under a liability policy when a progressive disease such as asbes-
tosis is involved. The court in Clemtex noted that the parties agreed to application of the
exposure rule. 807 F.2d at 1277-78. The courts in other jurisdictions have adopted at least
three different interpretations: (1) period of exposure, Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight
Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1219, 1225 (6th Cir. 1980); (2) the date of manifestation of
bodily injury, Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 17, 24 (1st Cir.
1982); (3) the "triple-trigger"-finding coverage as to all insurers from the point of initial
exposure up to the date of manifestation, Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d
1034, 1044-45 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1644 (1982). See Kahn, Looking for
"Bodily Injury": What Triggers Coverage under a Standard Comprehensive General Liability
Insurance Policy, 19 FORUM 532, 538-39 (1984).
118. In fact, the settlements in some instances were so small that the insurers' pro rata




121. Id. at 1277.
122. Id. (citing Monte Christo Drilling Corp. v. Universal Ins. Co., 376 F.2d 161, 163-64
(5th Cir. 1967); Vetrano v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 612 S.W.2d 689, 692 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ); Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Quality Meat & Provi-
sion Co., 556 S.W.2d 134, 135 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ)). But see Brooks,
Tarlton, Gilbert, Douglas & Kressler v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1358, 1364-66
(5th Cir. 1987) (suggesting only rule of strict construction, and not extrinsic evidence, can be
used to resolve ambiguities in exclusions and limitations in policy terms).
123. 739 S.W.2d 608, 612-13 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987 no writ).
124. Id. at 613. The underlying contract was a bilateral obligation to indemnify. Coin-
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court noted that the definition of contractual liability does not include liabil-
ity under a warranty of fitness or quality of the insured's products or a war-
ranty that work by or on behalf of the insured will be performed
diligently. 125 The court held that the policy provisions in question were
unambiguous. 126
Completed Operations and Product Exclusions. In Colony Insurance Co. v.
HR.K, Inc. 127 the insured sought coverage and a defense for a wrongful
death claim based on a suicide committed with a gun purchased from the
insured. The underlying action alleged strict liability under Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 402(a) 128 and the ultrahazardous activity rule and
negligence in selling a gun to the deceased with actual or constructive
knowledge of his mental instability.
The policy in H.R.K excluded claims falling within the completed opera-
tions and products hazards exception. The court held that the completed
operations exclusion did not apply because it was not intended to apply to
the sale of a product. ' 29 The court also held the products exclusion inappli-
cable.t30 The court observed that this exclusion generally applies only if a
defective product causes the injury.' 3 ' The court emphasized that the un-
derlying allegations involved negligent acts by H.R.K. and not the sale of a
defective pistol. 132
mentators have recognized that an assumption of liability involves a tripartite relationship in
which one party assumes the liability of another party to a third party. F. C. & S. Bulletin,
PUBLIC LIABILITY B-I (Oct. 1980); 8 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 4780(1981); 6B J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 4330 (1979). See Olympic Inc. v.
Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 648 P.2d 1008, 1011 (Alaska 1982); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
City of Turlock, 170 Cal. App. 3d 988, 999, 216 Cal. Rptr. 796, 803 (1985); Office Structures
Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 503 A.2d 193, 197 (Del. 1985). The agreement in Mary Kay did not
involve the insured's assumption of the claimant's liability to a third party. Thus, the alleged
breach of contract fell outside of the definition of contractual liability. 739 S.W.2d at 613.
125. Mary Kay, 739 S.W.2d at 613.
126. Id. The court refused to examine whether the doctrine of reasonable expectations
should be adopted by Texas courts as a method of interpreting insurance contracts because the
theory was not set forth in the insured's motion for partial summary judgment or response. Id.
at 613-14.
127. 728 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(a) (1965).
129. 728 S.W.2d at 851 (citing numerous cases from other jurisdictions). The court stated
this exclusion was intended to apply to service and maintenance businesses such as contrac-
tors. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. See Gordon Yates Bldg. Supplies, Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 543 S.W.2d
709, 714 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Yates the claimant sued the
insured for personal injuries resulting from improperly stacked lumber that the insured had
delivered. Yates, 543 S.W.2d at 711. That case did not involve allegations of failure to warn.
The court in Yates found no allegations in the underlying complaint stating that the lumber
was defective and that no warranty was made in connection with the work in question. Id. In
any event, the court's discussion of the meaning of the products' exclusion appears to have
been incidental in the court's decision. The Yates court stated three separate and distinct
reasons supporting its conclusion that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in
favor of the insured. Id. at 711-12. The court appears to have decided the case on the basis
that the defendant failed to submit proper summary judgment proof. Id.
132. H.R.K, 728 S.W.2d at 851.
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The decision in H.R.K. did not directly address the important question of
whether an allegation of a failure to warn is a sufficient allegation of a defec-
tive product to invoke the exclusion. One of the cases the court cited in
H.R.K., Cooling v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,133 specifically held
that a failure to warn of the need for adequate safety devices did not fall
within the products hazard exclusion. 1 34 The Cooling court emphasized that
the definition of products hazard does not include omissions or failures to
warn unless there is an affirmative duty. 1 35 It can be argued that the reliance
of the court in H.R.K on the Cooling decision suggests the direction Texas
courts will take on the issue. This does not, however, appear the better-
reasoned approach under Texas law.
The courts in other jurisdictions, even those choosing to generally follow
Cooling, have held that an allegation of failure to warn, when the danger
results from a defective product, falls within the products hazard exclu-
sion. 136 A number of other courts appear to have rejected strict adherence
to the Cooling rule.13 7 The Arizona Supreme Court in Brewer v. Home In-
surance Co. 138 emphasized that the failure to provide adequate instructions
and warnings was directly related to the product itself and thus fell within
133. 269 So. 2d 294 (La. Ct. App. 1972).
134. Id, at 297.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Viger v. Commercial Ins. Co., 707 F.2d 769, 771 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that
failure to warn of contamination of fish fell within products hazard exclusion); State Farm Fire
& Casualty Co. v. Avant, 404 So. 2d 1311, 1313 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that failure to
warn of defect in design and construction of brick structure fell within products exclusion);
Oceanonics, Inc. v. Petroleum Distrib. Co., 280 So. 2d 874, 878 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (holding
that failure to warn of defective weld in crane fell within products exclusion; distinguishing
Cooling on basis of actual physical defect in product).
137. Brewer v. Home Ins. Co., 147 Ariz. 427, 710 P.2d 1082, 1087 (Ct. App. 1985) (hold-
ing exclusion applied to claims insured failed to give adequate installation advice and failed to
warn of need for braces); Cravens Dargan & Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 29 Cal. App. 3d 594,
601, 105 Cal. Rptr. 607, 612 (1972) (holding that failure to warn of potential dangers of prod-
uct was not separate fault of manufacturer in sale of product after product was relinquished to
others and fell within product and completed operations hazard); K-C Mfg. Co. v. Shelby
Mut. Ins. Co., 434 So. 2d 1004, 1006 (Fla. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that claims as to design and
manufacture of go-kart involved allegations that bodily injury arose out of named insureds'
product or reliance upon a necessarily implied warranty with respect to its fitness and thus fell
within exclusion); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chem. Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d
127, 477 N.E.2d 1227, 1236 (1984) (holding that defective condition includes design defect,
manufacturing defect, failure to provide adequate warnings of dangerous or unavoidably un-
safe product); Jones v. Sears & Roebuck Co., 80 Wis. 2d 321, 259 N.W.2d 70 (1977) (holding
that failure to warn claim was clearly excluded by terms of policy). The rationale of these
cases was explained by the Arizona Supreme Court in Brewer v. Home Ins. Co., 147 Ariz. 427,
710 P.2d 1082, 1085 (Ct. App. 1985):
Products hazard coverage is intended to protect the manufacturer or seller of
goods from claims for injury and damage arising out of the use of the insured's
product. The risk which is being insured is that the product will not perform in
the manner expected. If the product works as it is supposed to, but through
other negligence, the insured's product causes injury or damage, there is no cov-
erage. Thus, where products hazard coverage is excluded, the insurer is not
responsible for the failure of the insured's products or goods to work as
anticipated.




The resolution of the question of whether failure to warn of known poten-
tial hazards is excluded under the products hazard exclusion ultimately may
be answered by looking to the Texas definition of a defective product. The
failure to warn of known potential hazards has been found by Texas courts
to render a product defective. 40 The courts have recognized three specific
types of defects under Texas law: (1) manufacturing defects; (2) design de-
fects; and (3) the failure to include sufficient warnings or instructions. 141
Texas courts appear to recognize that a product is defective or has some-
thing wrong with it whenever it is sold without sufficient warnings or
instructions. 142
III. AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY
Reservation of Rights. In Texas Farmers Insurance Co. v. McGuire 143 the
insured argued that Texas Farmers waived and/or was estopped from assert-
ing its defense of lack of coverage because Texas Farmers failed to provide
the insured with a timely and specific nonwaiver agreement or reservation of
rights letter. The supreme court held that the doctrine of estoppel cannot be
used to create insurance coverage that does not otherwise exist under the
terms of the policy. 44 The court distinguished Employers Casualty Co. v.
Tilley ' 45 on the basis that the estoppel doctrine in that case related to the
assertion of a late notice defense.' 46 The court stated that a forfeiture de-
fense, such as late notice, is subject to waiver or estoppel, but a defense deal-
ing with the scope of the risks covered, such as the defense that the vehicle
was not a covered auto, was not subject to waiver or estoppel. 147
139. Id. at 1085.
140. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Coming Corp. v. Thomas, 668 S.W.2d 876, 878-79 (Tex. App.-
Houston (14th Dist.] 1984, no writ) (holding failure to warn of danger of asbestos makes
product unreasonably dangerous). See also J. SALES, PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW IN TEXAS
622 (1985). A leading commentator has stated, "It is commonly said that a product can be
defective in the kind of way that makes it unreasonably dangerous by failing to warn or failing
adequately to warn about a risk or hazard related to the way a product is designed." PROSSER
& KEETON ON TORTS 697 (5th ed. 1984). This appears true despite the fact that a failure to
warn cause of action very often involves elements of negligence. Id.
141. Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1209 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
142. Id.
143. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 217 (Feb. 10, 1988). The court originally issued an opinion in
October of 1987; however, this opinion, reported at 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 22 (Oct. 21, 1987), was
withdrawn and a new opinion substituted for it in February of 1988.
144. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 216. The court noted in a footnote added without explanation to
its second opinion that one court of appeals has recognized that there is an exception to this
general rule where the insurer, with knowledge of facts indicating noncoverage, assumes or
continues the defense of an insured without obtaining a nonwaiver agreement or sending a
reservation of rights letter. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 216 n. I (citing Farmers Texas County Mu-
tual Insurance Co. v. Wilkinson, 601 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). The court mysteriously observed that this exception was not discussed in McGuire
because it was not "outcome-determinative." Id. It is difficult to discern how this rule could
not be "outcome-determinative" unless it is not a valid statement of the law or it is applicable
only where a case is being defended as opposed to being investigated. Id.
145. 496 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. 1973).
146. McGuire, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 216.
147. Id. But see Pacific Indem. Co. v. Acel Delivery Serv., Inc., 485 F.2d 1169, 1173 (5th
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In order to appreciate the significance of the Texas Supreme Court's opin-
ion in McGuire, it is essential to examine the opinion of the court of appeals.
The appellate court noted that after an initial interview with the insured, the
insurance company adjuster was aware of the existence of a coverage defense
and thus a conflict of interest existed. 148 Apparently, the insurer failed to
send out a reservation of rights letter or obtain a nonwaiver agreement in-
forming the insured of the coverage problems and the conflict until later.
The court of appeals noted that in Tilley the development of evidence for a
denial of coverage by the attorney hired by the insurer, without notice to the
insured of the coverage problems, and, the failure to inform the insured of
the need to obtain separate counsel amounted to a waiver by the insurer of
the policy defense and/or an estoppel to assert the policy defense.149 The
court held the same rule of conduct applied to the efforts of adjusters and
investigators. ' 50
The court of appeals in McGuire also held that a second statement, deal-
ing with coverage matters, supported the application of the Tilley rule. 15'
The court indicated that a general nonwaiver agreement executed before or
at the time of the second interview was insufficient as was a later reservation
of rights letter.'52 The court of appeals emphasized that the nonwaiver's
terms were too indefinite and expansive and that the agreement failed to set
out reasons for its execution, such as that the investigation conducted pursu-
ant to the agreement might be used to bolster the insurer's noncoverage
defense. 153
The insurer in McGuire did not send a reservation of rights letter until
after suit was filed against the insured, almost one year after its first notice of
the claim. The court of appeals held that this letter, which was more specific
and advised the insured he could seek his own attorney, was too late to be
effective. 15 4 The jury in McGuire found that the actions of the insurer did
not violate the DTPA or the Texas Insurance Code.155 The court of appeals
reversed the judgment based on these findings and held that the actions of
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1422 (1974) (holding all policy defenses waived if insurer has
knowledge of noncoverage and assumes defense of an action without nonwaiver agreement or
reservation of rights).
148. McGuire v. Texas Farmers Ins. Co., 727 S.W.2d 1, 2-3 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987),
rev'd, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 22 (Oct. 21, 1987).
149. 727 S.W.2d at 2-3.
150. Id. at 2. The court added that adjustors are not subject to canons of ethics like attor-
neys, and, thus, there is greater need for close judicial scrutiny of their conduct. Id. at 5.
151. Id. at 4.
152. Id
153. Id.
154. Id. at 5. This holding of the court appears to conflict with Ideal Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Myers, 789 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1986). In Ideal the reservation letter was not sent until two
years after the plane crash that was the subject of the underlying claim. The court in Ideal
stated that even if pre-suit investigation revealed a basis for noncoverage, any potential con-
flict, and thus any duty to reserve rights, did not arise until suit was filed. Id. at 1201. The
court noted, however, that this may not be true in every case. Id. at 1202. The court indicated
that in the case before it the insured did not show prejudice from any delay between discovery
of the coverage issues and the bringing of the suit. Id. See A. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS &
DISPUTES § 206 (1982), for an extensive discussion of the issue of prejudice.
155. McGuire, 727 S.W.2d at 6-7.
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the insurer in McGuire amounted to violations of the DTPA and the Texas
Insurance Code as a matter of law. 156
The Texas Supreme Court did not address whether the conduct in Mc-
Guire was actionable under the DTPA and the Texas Insurance Code,
choosing to resolve this issue by proper application of the "no evidence"
standard of review to the jury findings in favor of the insured. 157 Thus, the
supreme court's opinion in McGuire does not strictly foreclose, or for that
matter condone, insureds bringing suit under the DTPA, the Texas Insur-
ance Code, and, perhaps, even the duty of good faith and fair dealing for acts
or omissions in connection with the investigation and defense of claims
where coverage issues exist. 158
"Per Person" Limit. The Texas Supreme Court, in McGovern v. Williams, m5 9
held that "when only one person is actually involved in an automobile acci-
dent and sustains 'bodily injury' in that accident," article 6701h, the Texas
Safety Responsibility Law,' 6° "limits recovery for any and all claims to the
'per person' $10,000 limit.' 1 61 In McGovern, Mrs. McGovern, who was not
in the accident, sought recovery under a separate $10,000 limit for her claim
for loss of consortium. The court noted that section 21 of article 6701h
requires all motor vehicle liability policies to contain limits of $10,000 "'be-
cause of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident.' "162
The court in McGovern reasoned that section 21 refers to persons actually
involved in the accident, and, because Mrs. McGovern was not in the acci-
dent, she was not entitled to a separate limit. 163 The court added that bodily
injury does not include damages for loss of consortium, noting that such
damage claims do not involve physical harm or mental anguish.' 64 The
court emphasized that loss of consortium is a derivative claim despite the
fact Texas recognizes loss of consortium as a separate cause of action.165
The court found its reasoning consistent with other decisions interpreting
the similarly worded limits in the Texas Tort Claims Act. 166 The court also
156. Id. at 6.
157. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 216-17.
158. Id. The insured in McGuire sued under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE §§ 17.44, 17.46(a),
(b)(12), and 17.50(b)(4) (Vernon 1987) and TEX. INS. CODE art. 21.21, § 16(a), (b)(1) (Vernon
Supp. 1988). 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 216-17.
159. 741 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1987).
160. TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6701h (Vernon 1977).
161. 741 S.W.2d at 375.
162. Id. at 374 (emphasis omitted).
163. Id.
164. Id. (discussing Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. 1978) and Moore v. Lil-
lebo, 722 S.W.2d 683, 687-88 (Tex. 1986)).
165. Id. Similar reasoning was used in Cradoct v. Employers Casualty Co., 733 S.W.2d
301, 302 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, writ ref'd), in which the court held that the each person
limit in a general liability and automobile insurance policy referred to each person injured or
killed and not to each person suffering damages deriving from the death or injury.
166. 741 S.W.2d at 375 (discussing Madisonville Indep. School Dist. v. Kyle, 658 S.W.2d
149 (Tex. 1983) and City of Austin v. Cooksey, 570 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. 1978)). In Madisonville
the defendant's liability was limited to $100,000 under the Tort Claims Act, despite the fact
that separate claims were made by both the mother and father of the deceased. 658 S.W.2d at
150. In City of Austin the Texas Supreme Court held that per person, as used in the Tort
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noted that its decision accorded with the vast majority of other
jurisdictions. 167
In Cradoct v. Employers Casualty Co. 168 the court of appeals held that "all
damage claims direct or consequential" resulting from the death of a person
in an accident were subject to a single limit under a general liability and
automobile insurance policy. The court stated that the derivative claims of
beneficiaries who suffer damages as a result of the death of another do not
make the beneficiaries separate "injured persons" and thus no separate limits
are created by such claims. 169 The court of appeals, like the Texas Supreme
Court in McGovern, relied upon the numerous decisions applying the limits
of the Tort Claims Act in wrongful death cases.' 70 The claims in Cradoct
consisted of the full range of wrongful death damages, including mental
anguish. 171
The Texas Supreme Court, less than two months before its decision in
McGovern, refused to grant the application for writ of error in Cradoct with
the notation "writ refused."' 72 Under the present "writ" system, this nota-
tion means that the opinion of the court of appeals was correct and that the
principles of law declared in the opinion were correctly determined, thus
giving the opinion precedential value equal to a supreme court decision. 73
Thus, it would appear that the Texas Supreme Court has adopted the
Cradoct approach with respect to derivative mental anguish claims, as well
as consortium claims, in wrongful death cases. The decision in McGovern,
which came ten days prior to the denial of rehearing in Cradoct, strengthens
this conclusion.17 4
The court in McGovern emphasized that the first requirement of section 21
of 6701h is that the person claiming damages be involved in the accident in
Claims Act, refers to the person sustaining injury, not to the derivative claims of other parties.
520 S.W.2d at 388. Derivative claims, the City of Austin court held, are subject to a single
limit. Id. Importantly, the court in City of Austin used insurance cases from other jurisdic-
tions by analogy to support its interpretation. Id.
167. 741 S.W.2d at 375-76 (citing an extensive list of authorities). Courts adopting multiple
limits based on consortium claims have done so for a variety of reasons: (1) inclusion of loss of
services in the definition of bodily injury, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Handegard, 70 Or. App. 262, 688
P.2d 1387, 1389 (1984); (2) lack of specificity and clarity in the policy regarding whether
bodily injury must be suffered by more than one person, Abellon v. Hartford Ins. Co., 167 Cal.
App. 3d 21, 32, 212 Cal. Rptr. 852, 859 (1985); and (3) the term person as used in the policy is
ambiguous because it does not indicate whether the injured party or those with derivative
claims because of his or her injury may recover, Bilodeau v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co.,
392 Mass. 537, 467 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1984). 8 INS. LITIG. RPrR. at 1103-04 (Sept. 1986). See
Annotation, Consortium Claim of Spouse, Parent or Child of Accident Victim is Within Ex-
tended Per Accident Coverage Rather than Per Person Coverage of Automobile Liability Policy,
46 A.L.R. 4th 735 (1986), for a comprehensive review of cases involving the per person limit
question. The court in McGovern distinguished these decisions on the basis that they either
involved language different from article 6701h or the nature of the cause of action for consor-
tium was different from Texas law. 741 S.W.2d at 376.
168. 733 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, writ ref'd).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 302.
171. Id. Apparently, no bystander claims were asserted by the claimants in Cradoct. Id.
172. Cradoct v. Employer's Casualty Co., 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 604 (Sept. 16, 1987).
173. Hamilton v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 134 Tex. 377, 110 S.W.2d 561, 565 (1937).
174. Cradoct v. Employer's Casualty Co., 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 132 (Dec. 19, 1987).
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order to obtain a separate limit. 175 Moreover, the court noted that claims
that derive from injuries to another, such as loss of consortium, do not con-
stitute "bodily injury."'176 As recognized in Cradoct, loss of consortium, loss
of inheritance, loss of financial support, and mental anguish claims in wrong-
ful death actions would all appear to be derivative claims. 177
Some suggest one vital issue is left unresolved after McGovern and Cradoct
as to whether all mental anguish claims in nondeath actions will create sepa-
rate limits. The primary requirement of McGovern is that the person claim-
ing damages be involved in the accident in order to obtain a separate
limit. 178 Thus, unless the party claiming mental anguish was in the accident
itself, it would appear that separate limits would not be available.179 This
suggests that only independent bystander actions, based on presence within
the zone of danger, might create separate limits. This certainly appears to be
the approach suggested by Cradoct.
Notice. The insured in Ratcliff v. National County Mutual Fire Insurance
Co. 180 failed to forward suit papers to the insurer. The insured failed to
answer, and the claimant took a default judgment. After the insurer denied
coverage, the claimant filed suit against the insurer, claiming that article
6701h of the Texas Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act abolished the
late notice defense. 18
The insured in Ratcliff urged that the minimum coverage under the Re-
sponsibility Act is compulsory, in the same fashion as certified or assigned
risk policies, and policy violations are not a defense.' 82 The Ratcliff court
flatly rejected the insured's arguments, noting that the legislature did not use
language in the act sufficient to express such a far-reaching rule.183 The
court stated that the legislature had used specific language barring lack of
notice as a defense to certified or assigned risk policies, but not to other
automobile policies in the 1981 amendments at issue.' 84 The court rejected
the invitation to judicially abolish the notice defense. 185 The court stated
175. McGovern, 741 S.W.2d at 374.
176. Id.
177. One Texas court has suggested mental anguish claims are not derivative. City of
Denton v. Page, 683 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1985), rev'd on other grounds,
701 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. 1986). The Fifth Circuit has held this decision to be a "tenuous alien
graft" on the otherwise "sturdy framework of Texas law." Mayo v. Tri-Bell Indus., Inc., 787
F.2d 1007, 1011 (5th Cir. 1986). The Mayo court held that mental anguish and consortium are
in fact derivative claims. Id.
178. 741 S.W.2d at 374. See Nickens v. McGhebee, 184 So. 2d 271 (La. Ct. App. 1966)
(refusing additional recovery when claimants not present at accident and apparently suffered
no physical manifestations).
179. 741 S.W.2d at 374.
180. 735 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
181. Id. at 956 (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6701h (Vernon 1977 & Supp.
1988)).
182. Id. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6701h, § 21(f)(a) (Vernon 1977 & Supp.
1988).




that the Texas Supreme Court has consistently reserved such action for the
State Board of Insurance and the Texas Legislature.186
The court in Ratcliff held that the notice defense obviated coverage in the
case before it.187 The court recognized that the default clearly prejudiced
the insurer. 188 The court emphasized that the fact that the insurer was given
no notice of the filing of the suit bolstered the court's conclusion even
though the insurer knew of the claim.18 9
Change in Ownership. In Black v. BLC Insurance Co. 190 the insured, Web-
ster, sold his car to Linville, who sold the vehicle to a third party, Sanchez.
After the last sale, Sanchez was killed in a collision with Black. Black sued
the estate of Sanchez. Black sought a declaratory judgment that Webster's
insurer, BLC, covered Sanchez because Webster's policy still showed the
vehicle in the policy's declarations.
The Black court held that no coverage was available because Webster
neither retained control over the car nor had a familial relationship to
Sanchez.191 The Black court concluded that the insured's ownership of the
car was a prerequisite to coverage under the policy.' 92 The Black court rea-
soned that the policy language "your covered auto" implies that the insured
must own, possess, or control the use of the car for coverage to exist.' 93 The
court recognized that absent such facts, Sanchez could not be a permissive
user under the policy terms. 194 The court explained that public policy favors
the more restrictive interpretation because the broader interpretation would
greatly increase the risk in that a party is less careful in selecting buyers of
his car than in selecting those to whom he will give permission to drive his
car. 195
186. Id. at 958.
187. Id. at 959.
188. Id.
189. Id. In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Parce, 688 S.W.2d 680, 682 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), a case cited in Ratcliff, the court held that the insurer was not prejudiced by
the insured's failure to forward suit papers when the insurer knew suit had been filed and was
pending but the insured had not yet requested the company to provide a defense. The insurer
is presented with a "Hobson's Choice" in such cases because it is not clearly authorized to act
for an insured without a request to act and/or defend; indeed, by entering an unauthorized
appearance, the insurer may waive certain rights of the insured.
190. 725 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
191. Id. at 287-88. The court distinguished Snyder v. Allstate Ins. Co., 485 S.W.2d 769,
773 (Tex. 1972), in which the insured gave permission to use the vehicle to his daughter, and
retained some control, and retained the certificate of title. Black, 725 S.W.2d at 287-88. The
court noted that the Texas Supreme Court similarly distinguished Snyder in Gulf Ins. Co. v.
Bobo, 595 S.W.2d 847, 848 (Tex. 1980) (holding that a conditional vendee was not an addi-
tional insured/permissive user because the insured retained no control over the use of the
vehicle). Black, 725 S.W.2d at 288.
192. 725 S.W.2d at 288.
193. The court noted that the fact the named insured retained the certificate of title would
not change the result. Id. (citing Johnson v. Safeco Ins. Co., 464 S.W.2d 164, 170 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1971, no writ) (Texas rule); Sowa v. Nat'l Indem. Co., 102 Wash. 2d 571, 688
P.2d 865, 868 (1984) (majority rule)).




Underinsured Motorists Coverage (Limits). The issue of whether a carrier
may sell underinsured motorist coverage in an amount equal to the statutory
minimum limit was addressed in Tatum v. Mid-Century Insurance Co. 196 In
Tatum both the limits of the offending driver's policy and the insured's un-
derinsured motorist coverage were for the minimum limits, $15,000 per per-
son/$30,000 per accident. The court held that because the limits were the
same, the driver was not an underinsured motorist.197
The Tatum court stated that the fact the underinsured limits equalled the
minimum limits did not amount to a constructive fraud and was not against
the public interest. 198 The court indicated that such limited coverage would
not be illusory because even minimum limits are worthwhile when the un-
derinsured driver carries insurance less than the minimum, 199 and the limits
are reduced as a result of multiple claims. 200 The Tatum court stated that
its interpretation of the policy was consistent with the legislative purpose of
the Insurance Code and Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act.20 1 The
court concluded that the act imposed no duty on the insurer, Mid-Century,
to offer benefits exceeding the statutory minimum.20 2
Uninsured Motorists (Dismissal of Uninsured Motorist). The Dallas court of
appeals, in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Cascio,20 3 held that dis-
missal of an uninsured driver with prejudice, without the consent of the in-
surer, barred all claims for relief against the uninsured motorist carrier. The
court stated that the standard consent clause bars relief because of the de-
structive impact dismissal has on the insurer's subrogation rights.2° 4 The
court added that dismissal with prejudice makes it impossible for the insured
to establish a legal entitlement to recovery against the uninsured motorist, a
predicate to recovery under the policy and the Texas Insurance Code. 20 5
Owned and Unscheduled Vehicle Exclusion. In Beaupre v. Standard Fire In-
196. 730 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
197. Tatum, 730 S.W.2d at 42. Numerous Texas courts have held that policy provisions
allowing for the reduction of underinsured limits by the amount of the tortfeasor's policy limits
are valid and enforceable. Infante v. Texas Farmers Ins. Co., 640 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Montanye v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 638 S.W.2d 578 (Tex.
App.-Houston [st Dist.] 1982, no writ); American Gen. Fire & Casualty Co. v. Oestreich,
617 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1981, no writ). The courts in other jurisdictions have
taken a variety of approaches in dealing with such provisions. 2 WIDISS, UNINSURED AND
UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE § 41.7 (1987).
198. Tatum, 730 S.W.2d at 42.
199. This typically occurs where the driver is from a state where the minimum limits are
less than Texas limits. Id.
200. Id. This situation is a serious and frequent concern whenever either the per person or
per accident limits have been exhausted on other claims from the accident. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. 723 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
204. Id.; see also Sentry Ins. Co. v. Siurek, No. 01-85-01054-CV, slip op. (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.], April 30, 1987) (holding that settlement by insured under no-fault colli-
sion policy amounted to waiver of right to recover against insurer to extent of settlement
amount).
205. Cascio, 723 S.W.2d at 210; see TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1 (Vernon 1981).
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surance Co. 206 the plaintiff brought suit against Standard Fire for uninsured
motorist benefits. An entirely different carrier insured the vehicle involved
in the suit. Standard insured the family of the claimant, a passenger in the
vehicle, on two other vehicles. The Standard policy excluded uninsured mo-
torist coverage for injuries sustained while occupying a vehicle owned by the
insured or his family that was not insured under the Standard policy.
The Beaupre court held this exclusion did not constitute an invalid denial
of coverage in violation of article 5.06-1 of the Texas Insurance Code.20 7
The court recognized Texas's treatment of this exclusion had been somewhat
inconsistent.2°8 The court noted that in Westchester Fire Insurance Co. v.
Tucker 20 9 the Texas Supreme Court, in dicta, suggested the exclusion was
invalid.210 The court stated, however, that the supreme court retreated from
Tucker in Holyfield v. Members Mutual Insurance Co.211 Indeed, in
Holyfield the supreme court rejected holdings by courts of appeals based on
a strict reading of Tucker.212 The Beaupre court noted that three other
courts of appeals, after the decision in Tucker, had held the exclusion valid
under similar facts and circumstances, reasoning that article 5.06-1 dictated
the type of coverage that must be offered but not the specific vehicles that
must be covered.2 13
Other Insurance Clauses and Umbrella Policies. The Houston court of ap-
peals, in Carrabba v. Employers Casualty Co.,214 once again addressed the
question of coverage priority between multiple primary carriers and an um-
brella, or true excess carrier. In Carabba Employers had issued a compre-
hensive automobile liability policy to the owner of a tractor rig. Mission
issued an umbrella policy for the same insured. Gulf provided hired auto
coverage, by special endorsement, to the lessee of the tractor.
The Carabba court held that Employers, providing coverage for the owner
of the tractor, had the initial layer of coverage. 21  The court held that the
resolution of the conflict between Gulf, the primary insurer for the lessee,
and Mission, the umbrella carrier, was controlled by the court's earlier deci-
sion in Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. United States Fire Insurance Co.216
206. 736 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ denied).
207. Id. at 239 (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1 (Vernon 1981)).
208. Id.
209. 512 S.W.2d 679, 685-86 (Tex. 1974).
210. 736 S.W.2d at 238 (citing Tucker, 512 S.W.2d at 685-86).
211. 572 S.W.2d 672, 673 (Tex. 1978) (per curiam).
212. 736 S.W.2d at 238 (discussing rejection of Western Alliance Ins. Co. v. Dennis, 529
S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, no writ), by the supreme court in
Holyfield, 572 S.W.2d at 673).
213. Id at 238-39 (discussing Equitable Gen. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 620 S.W.2d 608, 611
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Broach v. Members Ins. Co., 647 S.W.2d 374,
375 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1983, no writ); and the court of appeals' opinion in Holyfield
v. Members Mut. Ins. Co., 566 S.W.2d 28, 29 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas), writ ref'd n&r.e per
curiam, 572 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1978)).
214. 742 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
215. Id at 715.
216. Id., at 714 (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 590 S.W.2d
783, 785 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
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As in Liberty Mutual, the crux of the conflict in Carrabba was the other
insurance clause in the hired auto endorsement to the Gulf policy, which
provided that coverage under the endorsement would be excess insurance
over other valid and collectible insurance. 217 In contrast, the Mission um-
brella policy provided that it would pay only the "ultimate net loss after all
other valid and collectible insurance had been exhausted. '218
The court in Carrabba stated that when the provisions in multiple policies
conflict, the court must resolve the conflict by examining the insurance
scheme and construing the policies as a group.219 The court held that the
Mission policy, in contrast to the Gulf policy, was not intended to serve as a
primary policy.220 The court noted that an umbrella policy is unique in
character and is always intended as "true excess over and above any type of
primary coverage including excess provisions arising from primary poli-
cies."'22 ' The court concluded that if an umbrella policy covers losses in
excess of underlying policies and their applicable limits, liability under the
umbrella policy does not attach until all other collectible insurance is ex-
hausted. 222 The Carrabba court rejected the alternative argument that Gulf
and Mission were co-equal excess carriers and, because their other insurance
clauses were mutually repugnant, liability should be prorated between
them.223 The court stated that the mutual repugnancy rule applies only to
repugnancies between policies supplying the same level of coverage. 224
IV. PROPERTY INSURANCE
Liability for Inspections. The court examined the tort liability of an insurer
who undertakes inspection of the insured's property to determine insurabil-
ity in Seay v. Travelers Indemnity Co. 225 A widow sued Travelers for negli-
gent inspection of a hospital boiler whose safety release valve discharged
scalding water onto her husband, a hospital maintenance worker, who later
died of his injuries. Travelers had voluntarily inspected the boiler for its
insured, the hospital, to determine the boiler's insurability. The Texas
Boiler Inspection Act 226 covered the boiler and required periodic inspection
and certification as a condition to operation. For a number of years, author-
ized inspectors employed by Travelers and commissioned by the State De-
partment of Labor and Standards conducted inspections of the hospital
217. Id., at 714-15.
218. Id. at 714.
219. Id. (citing Liberty Mutual, 590 S.W.2d at 785).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 715. The court stated that this was the majority rule. Id. at 12-13 (citing All-
state Ins. Co. v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 445 F.2d 1278, 1284 (5th Cir. 1971);
Berkeley v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 407 F. Supp. 960, 969 (W.D. Wash. 1975); Illinois Em-
casco Ins. Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 139 Ill. App. 3d 130, 487 N.E.2d 110, 112 (1985);
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co v. LiMauro, 65 N.Y.2d 369, 482 N.E.2d 13, 19 (1985)).
222. Id., at 715.
223. Id. Gulf relied on the mutual repugnancy rule discussed in Hardware Dealers Mut.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 444 S.W.2d 583, 590 (Tex. 1969).
224. Carrabba, 742 S.W.2d at 715 (discussing Hardware Dealers).
225. 730 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
226. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5221c (Vernon 1987).
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boilers and gave favorable reports to the hospital and the Labor and Stan-
dards Commissioner. The commissioner would then issue certificates al-
lowing lawful use of the boilers. The trial court granted Travelers' motion
for summary judgment on the basis that Travelers had no duty to the dece-
dent that could form the basis of a cause of action.227
The court of appeals in Seay held that Travelers failed to establish as a
matter of law that no legal duty arose from its allegedly negligent actions. 228
The court held that section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts229
imposes a duty on one who voluntarily undertakes to render services that
may be necessary for the protection of third persons and describes the scope-
of-duty concept prevailing in this state.230 The court held that Travelers was
not entitled to a summary judgment because it had not negated, as a matter
of law, any of the essential elements of the plaintiff's cause of action under
section 324A. 231 The court found evidence that at least one purpose of the
inspections was to increase the safety of the boilers for employees of the
insured.232 The court held that Travelers did not establish that it had not
undertaken to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff by the insured or that the
insured did not rely on the insurer to uncover the danger that resulted in the
harm to the plaintiff.233
Fire Coverage/Arson. In Norman v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. 234 the
Fifth Circuit dealt with the question of whether either spouse could recover
on a fire insurance policy when the husband destroyed the insured residence,
which was community property, by arson. The trial court granted judgment
to the insurer in reliance on the established Texas rule that neither spouse
could recover insurance proceeds when either of them deliberately destroyed
jointly owned insured property.235 The trial court was unaware that the
Texas Supreme Court, in Kulubis v. Texas Farm Bureau Underwriters Insur-
ance Co., 236 had recently held the rule inapplicable when separate property
held in undivided interests by a husband and wife was destroyed by the hus-
band's act of arson. The court in Kulubis, however, did not decide what
would happen if the insured property were community property. 237
The Fifth Circuit in Norman declined to follow the new separate property
rule in a community property situation, holding that the dominant consider-
ation in such cases is ensuring that the wrongdoer does not benefit from his
227. 730 S.W.2d at 775.
228. Id.
229. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1977).
230. 730 S.W.2d at 776 (citing Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co., 111 Tex. 461, 240 S.W. 517, 520-21
(1922)).
231. Id. at 778.
232. Id. at 778-79; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A(a) (1977).
233. 730 S.W.2d at 780; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A(b)(c) (1977). The
court noted that TEX. R. Civ. P. 51(b), dealing with joinder of insurers, did not prohibit an
action against the insurer for its own negligence. 730 S.W.2d at 781.
234. 804 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1986).
235. Id. at 1365.




wrongdoing. 238 The court stated that to hold otherwise would guarantee a
potential arsonist a minimum one-half of the insured value of the building
even if he were found guilty, so long as he arranged matters to prevent the
insurance company from proving that he let his spouse in on his scheme. 239
Scope of All-Risk Coverage. Highlands Insurance Co. v. City of Galveston 240
involved a dispute between an excess insurer and three primary all-risk in-
surers as to whether the all-risk policies provided liability coverage in addi-
tion to first-party property coverage. The critical issue was whether
language in the all-risk policies indicating that coverage was for all losses for
which the insured "may be liable or may assume liability," referred to legal
liability, as covered by a liability insurance policy, or to a monetary loss to
the insured for damage to his property. 24 1
The court of appeals in Highlands agreed with the excess insurer, finding
that the insuring language of the all-risk policy provided both property and
liability coverage. 24 2 The court stated that the policies insured the city for
the loss of property even though the property was not in its care, custody
and control.243 The court stated that if the insurers had intended to provide
property insurance only and to restrict such coverage to property under the
city's care, custody or control, they could have said so in their policies. 2 "
The court in Highlands also discussed the territorial limitation under the
policies to property in the Port of Galveston on premises owned, leased, used
or occupied by the board of trustees.245 The court concluded that the waters
adjacent to the piers at which the barge was damaged were part of the prem-
ises owned, leased, used or occupied by the board of trustees.246
Earth Movement Exclusion. In Jones v. St. Paul Insurance Co. 247 Jones sued
St. Paul to recover under his property insurance policy after the roof of his
commercial building collapsed. The issue before the court of appeals was
whether the earth movement exclusion in the insurance policy was properly
submitted to the jury. The court held that the exclusion contemplated ab-
normally large movements and was inapplicable as a matter of law.248 The
court reasoned that another exclusion, dealing with the settling of founda-
tions, would be meaningless if earth movement were construed as any move-
ment of the earth at all, as urged by the insurer.249
238. Norman, 804 F.2d at 1366.
239. Id.
240. 721 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
241. Id.at 471.
242. Id.




247. 725 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
248. Id. at 294-95. The only evidence at trial was that the soil had contracted and ex-
panded as a result of moisture content. Id. at 292.
249. Id. at 294-95.
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Contamination Exclusion. Auten v. Employers National Insurance Co.250
dealt with whether a contamination exclusion prevented coverage for dam-
age to a home caused by a professional exterminator's misapplication of pes-
ticides, rendering the home uninhabitable. The insureds sued the insurer,
arguing that either the loss did not result from contamination or the exclu-
sion did not apply because the exterminator's negligence caused the contami-
nation. Based upon jury findings that the misapplication of pesticides was
negligent, that it caused physical loss to the insureds' home, and that the loss
was not caused by contamination, the trial court held that insurer liable
under the policy. 25' The Dallas court of appeals reversed, holding that the
contamination caused the loss as a matter of law and that the exclusion was
unambiguous. 252
The court in Auten rejected the insureds' request that the court circum-
vent the language excluding contamination by fixing the cause of the loss as
the cause of the contamination. 253 The court held that the parties plainly
intended to exclude all losses occasioned by contamination without regard to
the cause of the contamination. 254 It reasoned that adopting the insureds'
reading of the policy would limit the provision to exclude recovery only
when the contamination itself was not the result of an excluded cause.255
The Texas Supreme Court has granted writ in this case. 256
V. HEALTH, LIFE, AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE
Change of Beneficiary. Two cases during the Survey period dealt with
changing the primary beneficiaries of life insurance policies. In Nichols v.
Nichols25 7 the insured died in an auto accident in 1982. Nichols, the insured
decedent, and his former wife, Betty Nichols, were married in 1963 and
purchased the life insurance policy in question in 1964; they were divorced
in 1977. Twenty months prior to the entry of the final divorce decree, the
decedent and Betty Nichols separated, and the decedent wrote the insurer
requesting that it change the beneficiary on the policy from his wife to his
mother. The insurer responded to Nichols' request by informing him that he
would have to return the forms required under the policy to effectuate the
change of beneficiaries. At the time the Nicholses were divorced, the divorce
decree awarded the cash value of the life insurance policy to Nichols, but the
decree failed to mention the contingent beneficial interest of Betty Nichols.
The court in Nichols held that the divorce decree did not divest Betty
Nichols of her contingent beneficial interest in the life insurance policy be-
cause the decree failed to specifically express that intent.25 8 The court fur-
250. 722 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ granted).
251. Id. at 468.
252. Id. at 470.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 470-71.
256. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 581 (July 15, 1987).
257. 727 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
258. Id. at 305.
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ther held that Nichols did not comply, or substantially comply, with the
policy requirements for changing the beneficiary because neither the policy
nor the completed forms required by the policy provisions were returned to
the insurer. 259 The court concluded that Nichols' intent in attempting to
change the primary beneficiary of the policy was irrelevant in determining
the issue of compliance or substantial compliance with the policy provi-
sions. 260 The court emphasized that the intent of the insured is relevant in
determining compliance or substantial compliance only in cases presenting
extraordinary circumstances. 261
Novotny v. Wittner 262 involved the extraordinary circumstances alluded to
by the Nichols court. In Novotny, Joseph and Debra Novotny were divorced
twenty-one days before Joseph Novotny's death. The divorce decree
awarded all insurance on Joseph Novotny's life to him as his sole and sepa-
rate property, and divested Debra Novotny of all interest in the policies.
Joseph Novotny was shot to death by Debra Novotny twenty-one days after
the divorce was finalized. At the time of his death, Joseph Novotny had not
changed the beneficiary designation on his life insurance policy. After a
trial, the probate court awarded the proceeds of the life insurance policy to
Joseph Novotny's children, his heirs at law.263
On appeal, the court recognized that a divorced spouse can be eligible as a
beneficiary of a life insurance policy on the life of the ex-spouse. 264 The
court noted, however, that the divorce decree expressly terminated Debra
Novotny's financial interest in Joseph Novotny's life insurance policy. 265
The court concluded that the decree expressed the clear intent of both par-
ties to terminate the ownership and beneficial rights of Debra Novotny in the
life insurance policy. 266 The court found that Joseph Novotny's failure to
change the beneficiary of the policy was not controlling since his death oc-
curred just twenty-one days after the divorce, thereby depriving him of the
right to finalize matters relating to the divorce. 267 The court also stated that
the evidence presented at trial rebutted the presumption of a gift of the in-
surance proceeds to Debra Novotny. 268 The court pointed to the fact that
the divorce proceedings were hostile and contested and also that Debra
Novotny killed Joseph. 269
Qualification of Beneficiary. In Crawford v. Coleman 270 Cornelius Shoaf
stabbed his wife, Sandra, to death. Four insurance policies, each designating
259. Id. at 306.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 306-07.
262. 731 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
263. Id. at 104.
264. Id.





270. 726 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. 1987).
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Cornelius as the primary beneficiary, insured Sandra's life. The trial court
disqualified Cornelius from receiving the proceeds under each of the policies
because the jury found that Cornelius willfully killed Sandra.271
The supreme court concluded that distribution of the policy proceeds was
governed by article 21.23 of the Texas Insurance Code.272 The court re-
jected its prior construction of section 21.23 in Deveroex v. Nelson,273
wherein it held that insurance proceeds are distributed to the nearest relative
of the insured only if all primary and contingent beneficiaries are disqualified
from receiving the proceeds. The Crawford court concluded that when any
beneficiary under a life insurance policy willfully causes the death of the
insured, the policy proceeds are distributed to the nearest relative of the in-
sured.274 This holding apparently deprives co-primary beneficiaries as well
as contingent beneficiaries of the right to proceeds in instances contingent on
article 21.23.
Coverage Period of Policy. In Life Insurance Company of North America v.
Klinger275 Klinger quit work with General Tire on July 26, 1985, and eleven
days later an unknown assailant killed him. While employed by General
Tire, Klinger was covered under an accidental death and dismemberment
policy. The policy provided that coverage terminated on the premium due
date immediately following the date Klinger ceased to be employed by the
company. The applicable premium due date was July 31, 1985. The policy
also had a conversion privilege, which provided that the insured, by making
written application within thirty-one days after termination of insurance,
could convert the group insurance coverage to an individual policy. At the
time of his death, Klinger had not exercised the conversion privilege under
the policy. The court of appeals concluded that coverage under the policy
terminated on July 31, 1985, and that the coverage did not extend during the
thirty-one day grace period. 276 The court recognized that section 2(10) of
article 3.50 of the Insurance Code,277 which provides that an insured with
group life insurance remains covered during the grace period even if the
insured does not exercise his option to convert, applies only to a life insur-
ance policy and not to an accidental death and dismemberment policy. 278
Disability Insurance (VA Benefits). The Texas Supreme Court, in Barnett v.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 10. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.23 (Vernon 1981) provides: "The interest of
a beneficiary in a life insurance policy or contract heretofore or hereafter issued shall be for-
feited when the beneficiary is the principal or an accomplice in willfully bringing about the
death of the insured. When such is the case, the nearest relative of the insured shall receive
said insurance." The Texas Legislature has amended art. 21.23 to consider contingent benefi-
ciaries if they are not principals or accomplices in bringing about the death of the insured.
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.23 (Vernon Supp. 1988) (eff. Aug. 31, 1987).
273. 529 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Tex. 1975).
274. Crawford, 726 S.W.2d at 11.
275. 730 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
276. Id. at 34.
277. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.50, § 2(10) (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1988).
278. Klinger, 730 S.W.2d at 35.
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Aetna Life Insurance Co. ,279 examined the issue of whether disability pay-
ments under the Veterans Benefits Act 280 may offset benefits payable under
disability insurance issued by a group health carrier. The insured argued
that VA benefits were not specifically mentioned in the contract's enumera-
tion of offset sources. The insured also urged this construction under the
rule of ejusdem generis. Finally, the insured argued that the rule of strict
construction applied. The supreme court agreed, noting that the language in
the policy was susceptible to more than one reasonable construction. 281 The
court, however, rejected the insured's argument under the rule of ejusdem
generis because the contract did not just include a specific enumeration, but
also included a general language clause. 28 2
With respect to the ambiguity issue, the court emphasized that it must
adopt the construction urged by the insured if the construction is not unrea-
sonable even if the insured's construction is not the most reasonable. 283 The
court held that VA benefits were not sufficiently similar to the specifically
enumerated sources (including the Social Security Act, Railroad Retirement
Act, and Workers' Compensation Act) to justify inclusion in the general
language clause.284 The court held that if the insurance company had de-
sired to exclude VA benefits it could have done so easily with plain and un-
ambiguous language as it had in the case of the other sources. 285
VI. MISCELLANEOUS
Title Insurance. In Houston Title Co. v. De Toca 286 the purchaser of a home
sued her title insurer after the City of Houston razed her home pursuant to a
demolition order filed in the county deed records several months before the
house and lot were conveyed to the purchaser. The purchaser alleged that
the insurer negligently failed to inform her of the demolition order.
Although the purchaser prevailed in the trial court,287 the court of appeals
reversed and rendered judgment that she take nothing from the title in-
surer.288 The court reasoned that, unlike an abstract examiner who is hired
to detect flaws in a seller's title, a title insurer is legally obligated under the
policy only to indemnify the purchaser for losses resulting from defects in
279. 723 S.W.2d 663, 664-65 (Tex. 1987), rev'g, 708 S.W.2d 911, 912 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1986).
280. 38 U.S.C. § 3101(a) (1982).
281. 723 S.W.2d at 666.
282. Id. at 666, 668. The court emphasized that the use of ejusdem generis in this case
would render the general language clause meaningless and, thus, fail to give meaning to all
portions of the policy. Id. at 668.
283. Id. at 666.
284. Id. at 667.
285. Id. The court did not address the impact of § 3101(a) (commonly called the "anti-
assignment provision") of the Veterans Benefit Act, which includes certain prohibitions
against assignment and deductions from benefit payments. 38 U.S.C. § 3101(a) (1982). The
court of appeals had held that this provision did not prohibit the offset desired by Aetna. 708
S.W.2d at 912-13.
286. 733 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ granted).
287. Id. at 326.
288. Id. at 328.
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title. 28 9 Further, the court distinguished Gibbs v. Main Bank 290 and Great
American Mortgage Investors v. Louisville Title Insurance Co.291 because in
both cases the title insurers were liable, not for the breach of a contractual
duty, but for violating duties extrinsic to the indemnitor-indemnitee relation-
ship. 292 Finding that the title insurer owed no contractual duty to the pur-
chaser to disclose defects in the seller's title and that the purchaser failed to
allege a breach of an extracontractual duty, the court held that the purchaser
was not entitled to recover from the title insurer for negligence. 293
ERISA. At issue in Sams v. N. L. Industries, Inc.294 was the question of
whether the federal Employer Retirement Income Security Act of 1975295
preempted a former employee's common law causes of action to recover
amounts allegedly owed under an employment contract. After the employee
suffered an injury unrelated to his job, his employer discharged him because
of the employee's excessive absences during the year preceding his injury.
Seeking recovery of sick leave pay, severance pay and disability compensa-
tion, as well as punitive damages and attorney's fees, the employee sued his
employer for breach of contract, conversion, and violating ERISA. All
grounds of recovery arose from the employer's alleged refusal to pay the
employee pursuant to the terms of a benefit plan the employer maintained
for its employees. The trial court rendered summary judgment that the em-
ployee take nothing on the conversion and breach of contract theories be-
cause ERISA preempted the claims and dismissed the ERISA claim. for
failure to state a cause of action.296
With respect to the trial court's rendition of judgment on the employee's
cause of action for breach of contract, the court of appeals faced two issues:
first, did ERISA cover the benefit plan, and second, did the remedies pro-
vided under ERISA preclude recovery on state law causes of action.297 The
court concluded that the sick leave pay, severance pay and disability com-
pensation claimed by the employee were all part of an ERISA-regulated em-
ployee welfare benefit plan because each benefit fell within the scope of the
statutory definition of regulated plans. 298 Having determined that the bene-
fit plan in question was within the scope of plans governed by ERISA,299 the
court held that the federal statutory scheme expressly precluded recovery on
state common law grounds.300
289. Id. at 327 (citing Tamburine v. Center Say. Ass'n, 583 S.W.2d 942, 947 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Wolff v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 345 S.W.2d
565, 569 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
290. 666 S.W.2d 554, 559 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
291. 597 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
292. 733 S.W.2d at 327.
293. Id.
294. 735 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
295. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1976).
296. 735 S.W.2d at 487.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 488; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 186(c), 1002(1) (1982).
299. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a) (1982).
300. Sams, 735 S.W.2d at 488-89 (citing Holland v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1140,
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Aircraft. American Eagle Insurance Co. v. Lemons301 arose from the crash
of a new airplane on the day it was purchased. The craft's pilot and passen-
ger, co-owners of the plane, died in the crash. Apparently, neither co-owner
had obtained any insurance expressly declaring the plane as a covered air-
craft; however, the pilot also owned another airplane that was covered under
a personal injury and property damage aircraft policy issued by American
Eagle. The American Eagle policy declared the pilot as the named insured.
The policy in Lemons specified coverage, under certain conditions, for air-
craft the named insured purchased. The insurer argued that, in light of
other policy provisions, ownership by the named insured required that the
named insured be the sole owner. Noting that the newly acquired aircraft
provision failed to expressly require sole and unconditional ownership, the
court rejected the insurer's argument. 302
The insurer also argued that, even if the policy covered the crashed air-
plane, the policy did not cover the passenger. As a co-owner, the passenger
necessarily became an additional insured under the policy, whose estate was
not entitled to compensation because the policy limited coverage to third
parties and because the policy prohibited the transfer of policy interests to
persons other than the named insureds. The court of appeals held that the
newly acquired aircraft clause only provided coverage for additional aircraft,
not additional named insureds. 30 3 Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial
court's judgment that American Eagle indemnify the named insured's estate
for $100,000 of the $250,000 settlement. 3° 4
Reinsurance. In Great Atlantic Life Insurance Co. v. Harris30 5 the court
held the reinsurer directly liable to the initial insurer. The case arose when
the initial insurer, a Florida corporation, sought reinsurance from a Texas
insurer not licensed in Florida. To avoid the licensing problems, an interme-
diary insurer reinsured the insurer's policies and then reinsured through the
Texas reinsurer. When the intermediary went into receivership, the initial
insurer and reinsurer cancelled their agreement. 30 6 Moreover, the reinsurer
refused to reimburse the initial insurer for claims under policies the latter
had agreed to reinsure before the parties terminated their agreement.
The insurer sued to recover that portion of the claims that it believed the
reinsurer should have paid pursuant to the tripartite reinsurance agreement.
The trial court, however, rendered judgment on jury findings that the insurer
1146 (4th Cir. 1985); Winterrowd v. David Freedman & Co., 724 F.2d 823, 826 (9th Cir.
1984); Russell v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 482, 487 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd on
other grounds, 473 U.S. 134 (1985); Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208,
1215-16 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968 (1981); District 65, UAW v. Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 1468, 1487 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
301. 722 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1986, no writ).
302. Id. at 231-32.
303. Id. at 233.
304. Id. at 234.
305. 723 S.W.2d 329, 333 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ dism'd.).
306. Id. at 331.
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take nothing. 30 7 On appeal, the reinsurer argued that the trial court's judg-
ment was correct because only the intermediary was contractually obliged to
reimburse the insurer; the insurer had no direct contractual relationship
with the reinsurer.
The court of appeals rejected the contention that the contract between the
insurer and the intermediary was unrelated to the contract between the in-
termediary and the reinsurer.30 8 The court noted that it would be illogical
to treat the two written instruments as separate contracts since both con-
cerned the same transaction and were executed simultaneously to accom-
plish one purpose.30 9 The court construed the two written instruments as
one contract between the insurer and the reinsurer, with the intermediary
acting merely as a conduit for their business relationship, and rendered judg-
ment for the insurer. 31 0
307. Id. at 332.
308. Id.
309. See id. at 332-33.
310. Id. at 333-34.
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